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STATE-CENTRIC CO-OPERATION REGIME
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[The International Criminal Court is one of the great international institutions in mankind’s history with the
potential to reconfigure significant aspects of the international system with regard to criminal jurisdiction. But
like the international penal institutions before it, the success of the ICC revolves around international
cooperation. An institutional check on the ICC’s power is that it will have to work through States. States Parties
will be asked to arrest and surrender suspects, investigate and collect evidence, extend privileges and immunities
to ICC officials, protect witnesses, enforce ICC orders for fines and forfeiture and, at times, prosecute those who
have committed offences against the administration of justice. The ICC will rely heavily on the cooperation of
States Parties individually and collectively for its success. This article provides an analysis of the ICC’s
international cooperation and judicial assistance regime as well as an insight into the approaches that States
Parties have adopted in seeking to give effect to the letter and spirit of their obligations domestically.]

INTRODUCTION
It was at the end of World War II that the door to the future possibility of a permanent
international criminal court was practically opened with the establishment of two international
military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo. In 1946, the inaugural session of the UN General
Assembly adopted Resolution 95(I) which affirmed ‘the principles of international law
recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the [IMT]
Tribunal.’2 In 1951, the UN established a Special Committee of the General Assembly for the
purpose of drafting a convention for the establishment of an international criminal court.3
After decades of political wrangling and disagreement in 1998, States finally agreed to adopt
1
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the Rome Statute for the establishment of an International Criminal Court,4 closing the circle
on the efforts first inaugurated at the end of World War I. Support for the ICC was
overwhelming.5 However, several key States, most notably the United States, were among
those opposing or abstaining.

‘There is little doubt that the end of political and military confrontation between the super
powers (also known as ‘cold war’) … supplied the necessary, albeit not sufficient,
precondition for the efforts to create the International Criminal Court to be taken seriously.
That political opportunity was, however, far from enough to render these efforts successful.
Nonetheless, it developed the right climate in which the political will could grow and from
which it eventually has emerged. But there was even more important component: the Rome
Conference. It served as a litmus test to see whether or not the international community en
globe [had] achieved such a level of development that would enable the nations to restore
peace and order and maintain it, using the International Criminal Court.’6 The overwhelming
support for the Court seems to reflect a growing belief that today, ‘nations, States and
governments are capable of thinking and making decisions not only in particular (egoistic)
categories, but also in a global context…Apparently, the majority of governments and their
representatives in Rome came to the conclusion that justice for the most heinous crimes is
much too serious and important to be meted out by individual States.’7
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The dilemma of building agreement among State Parties without diluting core principles
essential to an effective international penal regime coloured the Rome conference.8 The
process of making the Rome Statute was a battleground regarding whether the ICC should
establish a ‘vertical’ or a ‘horizontal’ paradigm vis-à-vis States. Elaborating on the nature of
these paradigms, Professor Antonio Cassese notes:

The former concerns relations between two sovereign States and is therefore a reflection of the
principle of equality of States; it gives rise to a horizontal relationship. The latter, instead, concerns
the relation between a State and an international judicial body endowed with binding authority; it is
therefore the expression of a vertical relationship.9

Considering that fundamental norms, rules, and practices of international law rest on the
premise of the State, the paradigm to be adopted was especially important to the ultimate
effectiveness of the ICC. The reluctance of States to give way to international criminal
jurisdiction with respect to matters which would otherwise be subject to their exclusive
sovereignty was clear in negotiations that dealt with the allocation of jurisdiction between the
court and national authorities. Many States were wary that an international penal process that
was based on the ‘vertical’ paradigm would significantly contribute to the threatening of the
overall concept of sovereignty. However, the ICC’s goal of attempting to influence the
behaviour of individuals at all levels of authority and power through enforcement of
international law only stood a good practical chance through incorporation of the tenets of a
‘vertical’ paradigm which would limit States’ ability to frustrate the work of the ICC. In the
end, a number of solutions adopted in the Rome Statute ‘differ from typical and traditional
constructions, which transpire from international treaty regulations, with respect to constituent
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elements of particular forms of cooperation’10 a manifestation of the ‘vertical’ paradigm.

The challenge was the need for a trade-off between achieving consistency and building
consensus.11 This was arguably more pronounced in part because the State was being called
upon to reconfigure certain key aspects of its domestic jurisdiction as well as State-crafted
inter-national regimes in favour of a functioning international regime.12 Consultations,
consensus and compromise were at the heart of the Statute making process. In an articulate
encapsulation of this triad, Professor M Plachta states:

Triple ‘C’ was a dominant tone at the Conference. Consultations-Consensus-Compromise describes
both the organisational framework and the tools that were adopted at the Conference. While the first
element is procedure-oriented, the last two are result-oriented, with one important distinction between
them. The second component sets the threshold, whereas the third determines the contents of the final
result. The first two elements out of this triad facilitate and encourage achieving the last one. That
compromise will be a matter of ‘life and death’ became apparent at the very beginning of the
Conference, when the delegates started presenting their positions specified in instructions from their
capitals. Not surprisingly, those views reflected the many options and alternative solutions contained
in the main Conference document. Compromise was, therefore, the only way out of this situation in
order to avoid a stalemate. At the same time, the main concern of the delegates was the question of
how to reach a middle ground and acceptable solution without compromising and endangering the
whole underlying idea. For various reasons, compromise could have been criticised as rendering the
adoption of the only ‘right’ or ideal solution impossible.13

Reflecting on the tension between domestic jurisdiction and international penal requirements
Dr Chimene Keitner observes that, ‘[t]he Rome Statute embodies a carefully crafted
compromise between a State-centred idea of jurisdiction, and a more inclusive international
vision. The State-centred idea, in its extreme manifestation, would uphold a State’s exclusive
jurisdiction to prosecute and try its own citizens for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity, and to prosecute and try citizens of other States who commit such acts on the
territory of the forum State. An inclusive vision would promote the idea of universal

10

Plachta, above n 6 at 185-186.
Ibid 217.
12
Ibid 215.
13
Ibid 186-187.
11

4

jurisdiction, whereby individuals of any nationality could be tried for certain crimes by any
State acting on behalf of humanity as a whole. The ICC follows a middle path.’14 Under the
Rome Statute, primary jurisdiction is assigned to the ICC’s Member States with the ICC as a
fallback mechanism. In the event that States are unwilling or unable to carry out their
obligation to investigate and prosecute crimes, the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction is
triggered allowing the ICC to step in to fill the lacuna.15

The Statute adopted at the Rome Conference can be labelled a direct enforcement variant of
international criminal law. It reflects the ‘Direct Enforcement Model’ as elaborated by
Professor M C Bassiouni,16 which presupposes the existence of the International Criminal
Court and the supporting machinery needed in any criminal justice system. It contains all the
necessary elements of the criminal legislation, such as a ‘general part’ which typically
includes the principles of criminal liability, defences, and sanctions, ‘code of criminal
procedure,’ as well as problems traditionally discussed under the aegis of international
cooperation in criminal matters.17

An intriguing aspect of the Rome Statute which underscores its nature as a constitutive
document is that it combines jurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate, and to enforce all in one
instrument. The Court’s success or failure revolves around its enforcement provisions as
encapsulated in Part 9 of the Statute-the international cooperation and judicial assistance
regime. The provisions of this part establish the conditions under which the international
14
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community, or more precisely the States Parties to the Statute, may enforce orders and
directions of the Court. But like the international penal institutions before it, the success of the
ICC revolves around international cooperation. An institutional check on the ICC’s power is
that it will have to work through States in conducting investigations, obtaining evidence, and
apprehending suspects. International cooperation and judicial assistance as set out in the
Rome Statute is at the very heart of the ultimate effectiveness of the Court by placing an
affirmative obligation on States.18

This Article has as its modest aim an exposition of the complex international cooperation
regime that the Rome Statute sought to craft as well as placing this within the wider context of
the international system. The goals are threefold: first, to provide a descriptive account
surrounding the Rome Statute’s international cooperation and judicial assistance regime;
second, to offer a legal analysis of the regime as well as an insight into the approaches that
States have adopted in implementing their obligations and third, to expose the potential
dangers facing the Court especially through Article 98 which contains provisions relating to
waiver of immunity and consent to surrender.

THE BLASKIC CASE: UNDERLINING THE VITALITY OF A ‘VERTICAL’
PARADIGM & PREDICTING A TOUGH NEGOTIATION
The creation of the ICTFY and the ICTR raised questions concerning the appropriate
relationship between international ad hoc institutions and national courts. The Statutes of
these Tribunals recognise that national courts have concurrent jurisdiction while clearly
16
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asserting the primacy of the International Tribunals.19 This extraordinary jurisdictional
priority is justified by the compelling international humanitarian interests involved and by the
Security Council’s determination that the situation in the former Yugoslavia, as well as that in
Rwanda, constituted a threat to international peace and security. With regard to both ad hoc
tribunals, States needed to establish domestic procedures for implementing in order to give
effect to the obligations or to comply with requests or orders concerning taking of evidence,
the surrender or transfer of accused persons etc.

Many States subsequently modified domestic law or enacted new legislation to facilitate
fulfilment of their obligations. The new balance achieved between the jurisdiction of national
courts and that of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals in many ways marked the end of
an era when the exercise of criminal jurisdiction fell within the unfettered prerogatives of the
sovereign State. Though the Security Council created each of the two existing international
criminal tribunals ad hoc as an extraordinary response to a specific and narrowly defined
threat to international peace and security, to enable them to address these threats, the practice
and application of the provisions of the ICTFY and the ICTR Statutes relating to international
cooperation, foreshadowed the political and legal disputes over the creation of a permanent
International Criminal Court (ICC) and the possible contours of its cooperation regime.

In January 1997, when Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, presiding over Trial Chamber II
agreed to the Prosecutor’s request to issue subpoenae duces tecum to the State of Croatia and
18
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its Defence Minister, she opened the door for the ICTFY to demonstrate among other things
the extent to which State sovereignty had been weakened by the international penal
institutions as well as providing an opportunity to give a ringing endorsement of the ‘vertical’
paradigm as an appropriate model through which to give ‘teeth’ to international penal
institutions in seeking to enforce the obligations of states to cooperate.

Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaskic20 was, until the summer of 1997, one of the more interesting
cases before the ICTFY, if only because the promotion of Colonel Blaskic to General in
August 199321 made him the highest-ranking detainee in The Hague.

22

On 15 January 1997,

at the instigation of the Prosecutor, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald issued subpoenae duces
tecum to the Republic of Croatia and to its Defence Minister Gojko Susak23 requesting
thirteen specified categories of documents believed to be of evidentiary value in relation to
the Blaskic Case.24 The subpoenae were issued pursuant to the Prosecutor’s request, relying
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on Articles 18(2) and 19(2) of the Statute and Rules 39(ii), (iv), and Rule 54 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence.25 Croatia, in a letter dated 10 February 1997, declared its readiness
for full cooperation under the terms applicable to all States but challenged the legal authority
of the International Tribunal to issue a subpoena duces tecum to a sovereign State and
objected to the naming of a high government official in a request for assistance pursuant to
Article 29 of the Statute of the International Tribunal.26 The subpoenae were suspended ten
days later by Judge McDonald in order to discuss ‘important questions of principle’ with the
parties, including the power of a Judge to issue a subpoena to a sovereign State or to a high
government official of that State.27

The Trial Chamber considered its own decision and on 18 July 1997 upheld and reinstated the
subpoenae, declaring that ‘a Judge or Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal has the
authority and power to issue orders to States and individuals, including high government
officials, for the production of documents required for the preparation or conduct of a trial . .
.’ and that those States and officials were under a clear obligation to comply with such
orders.28 Declaring both the order and the term ‘subpoena’ to have been appropriate, the Trial
Chamber demanded compliance by 18 August 1997.29

This was, however, met with further objections, and the subpoena issue went to appeal. On 22
September 1997, Croatia’s challenge to the subpoenae duces tecum and the subpoena
25
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Decision of Trial Chamber II was heard by the Appeals Chamber.30 Surprisingly, the Appeals
Chamber appeared to agree with Croatia, at least in part, and in a dramatic turn it
‘unanimously quashed’ both subpoenae. Yet the drama of a unanimous decision to quash the
subpoenae, on further examination, failed to change the direction of the Tribunal much at all.
While quashing the subpoenae per se, the Appeals Chamber allowed the Prosecutor to submit
a new request for a ‘binding order to [the State of] Croatia alone.’31

In effect the Appeal Chamber’s judgment extended the Tribunal’s reach beyond the power to
indict, try, and imprison individuals by strengthening the Tribunal’s claim to demand the
loosely defined ‘cooperation’ of States. In recalling Croatia’s challenge, in which the State
contested the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to issue binding orders to States such as itself, the
Appeals Chamber rejected this denial of jurisdiction as a ‘manifest misconception’32 and
asserted that ‘it is self-evident that the International Tribunal, in order to bring to trial persons
living under the jurisdiction of sovereign States, not being endowed with enforcement agents
of its own, must rely on the cooperation of States.’33 It went on, in practical terms, to say that
the International Tribunal ‘must turn to States if it is effectively to investigate crimes, collect
evidence, summon witnesses and have indictees arrested and surrendered to the International
Tribunal,’34 pointing to the very clauses that may be the most objectionable to the States.

29
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Despite upholding Croatia’s arguments for State sovereignty, the Appeals Chamber also ruled
that States would not be allowed to claim national security interests for withholding
documents or other evidentiary materials requested by the International Tribunal unless the
legitimacy of their concerns has been assessed by a Trial Chamber.35 The Appeals Chamber
hoped to avoid frivolous appeals to State security by instituting a strict review standard on all
such claims.

The Blaskic Case, then, may ultimately be most noteworthy for its role in more clearly
defining the reach of the Tribunal over States themselves. With the handing down of the
Appeal Chamber’s judgment on the subpoenae duces tecum--quashing the terminology but
upholding the substance--the Tribunal gained some strength in terms of exacting from States
more than the unwilling ‘cooperation’ to which they had bound themselves in the Dayton
Accords. The Blaskic Case demonstrated that, backed up loosely by the Security Council, the
Tribunal in fact has the power to issue binding orders to sovereign States.

Though the Blaskic Case demonstrated the tenacity of the State in guarding its sovereignty it
broke new ground. It demonstrated that the significance of international penal process and its
accompanying tenet of international justice reflects an evolution in the perception of
sovereignty heralding a qualitative shift which necessitates an ethical vision in which
enforcement of international norms supersedes certain State rights and prerogatives. This
institutionalisation of international penal process represents a shift in authority from States to
the international community with the notion of international justice now pointing towards a
sphere that though controlled by States, is ineffaceably external to power. It was against the
background of this monumental case as well as the trials and tribulations that the two ad hoc
35
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international criminal tribunals had encountered in their operations that States assembled in
Rome in the summer of 1998 with the goal of creating a permanent international penal
tribunal.

THE ROME STATUTE’S INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND JUDICIAL
ASSISTANCE REGIME
Given that the Court does not have at its disposal its own police, military or law enforcement
forces, it has to rely entirely on the assistance rendered by the authorities of the States.
Moreover, since the Court is not allowed to hold trials in the absence of the accused, the only
way to avoid the Court being completely paralysed is to provide it with a tool that can be used
to effectively secure the presence of defendants before it. The extent to which States, by
becoming parties to the Rome Statute, take on obligations to assist the ICC in activities on
their own territory is very much an issue of sovereignty. As with other areas defining the
relationship between the ICC and States, the Rome Statute’s final text balances the
willingness of States to make commitments necessary for the ICC to function, with a
recognition that the ICC will operate in a world of sovereign States.36 As Jerry Fowler notes,

[t]he accommodation of sovereignty begins with the nature of the general obligation that States
undertake by becoming parties to the ICC Statute. Proponents of a strong ICC favoured a duty to
‘comply’ with orders, rather than an obligation of ‘cooperation,’ which was deemed to be vague and
weak. Article 86 of the ICC Statute, ‘[g]eneral obligation to cooperate,’ reflects the latter formulation,
requiring State Parties to ‘cooperate fully with the Court.’ In an art form solution, however, specific
articles on surrender of suspects and other forms of cooperation require States to ‘comply with
requests’ from the ICC.37
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The international cooperation and judicial assistance regime encapsulated in Part 9 of the
Statute is one of the most complex sections of the Rome Statute. The 17 Articles of this Part
address the interaction between the Court and States in the arrest and transfer of suspects to
the Court, and in the conduct of investigations or prosecutions by the Court on State territory.
Not surprisingly, Part 9 is the least ‘supranational’ section of the Statute. Although Article 86
requires States Parties to ‘cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution
of crimes,’38 the Articles that follow are riddled with numerous exceptions and
qualifications.39 Only effective, efficient, prompt and real assistance, and cooperation of states
will guarantee the viability of the court.40

A. Implementing Legislation
As classically conceived, jurisdiction to enforce concerns rules governing the enforcement of
law by a State through its courts, as well as through ‘executive’, ‘administrative’, and ‘police
action’.41 In relation to the envisaged international penal process, the most obvious point is
that the ICC has no police force.42 Indeed, it was unthinkable to propose one either before or
during Rome, although there was at least some precedent for doing so.43 But the orders of the
Court, whether they be arrest warrants, judgments, orders to seize assets, or sentences, will
need to be enforced. The delegates were not unaware of the problem and many provisions of

38
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the Statute address it directly.44 But virtually all of them are premised on three principles.
First, the Court will not be permitted to sanction States directly for non-compliance with its
orders. Rather, the Court will be required to make findings of non-compliance and direct
those to the Assembly of States Parties and the Security Council, in the case of a Security
Council referral to the Court. Second, the Court may not compel State compliance with its
orders.45 Third, the personnel of the Court will have no right, in most cases to proceed directly
to the execution of their duties on the territories of States, but will work through the
authorities present in the requested State, and will be subject to national law.46 However there
are exceptional circumstances in which the ICC can take evidence directly on the territory of
a State Party without having secured the consent of the State Party pursuant to articles
57(3)(d), 54(3)(d) and 99(4).

Article 57(3)(d) establishes that judicial authorisation for a direct investigation on the territory
of a State Party may be granted without having secured the cooperation of that State.
However, this extraordinary power is subject to the condition that the State Party is clearly
unable to execute a request for cooperation due to the unavailability of any
authority…competent to execute the request…under Part 9’.47 This article seems to be a
safety net to facilitate the Court’s activities in failing States where there is no credible legal
system in place to do it for the Court or in failed States where the State or parts of it may be
under the occupation and control of a third party for instance a peacekeeping force. Even with
reliance on the local legal systems of functional States, Article 54(3)(d) provides that the
Prosecutor may seek cooperation of any State or intergovernmental organisation and may

44
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seek a ‘suitable’ arrangement’ with any of them, in accordance with its respective competence
and/or mandate’.48 Article 99(4) similarly provides the Prosecutor with power to directly
execute a request that is unencumbered by compulsory measures. This provision was amongst
the most controversial in the Rome Statute and threatened to create a major political firestorm.
However, the provision is carefully drafted and will not in practice grant the Prosecutor
unbridled power rather it seems to rely on tacit State consent. The Prosecutor must enter into
‘all possible consultations’ with the requested State Party, as well49 considering that an
entirely hostile or antagonised government will render the authority meaningless.50

In sum, the ICC will rely heavily on the cooperation of States Parties for its success. States
Parties will be asked to arrest and surrender suspects, investigate and collect evidence, extend
privileges and immunities to ICC officials, protect witnesses, enforce ICC orders for fines and
forfeiture and, at times, prosecute those who have committed offences against the
administration of justice. Key to this cooperation will be domestic legislation permitting the
State Party to assist the ICC when requested. While States may use different approaches to
incorporate the same obligation, they do so by meeting the requirements of the Rome Statute.
The current pace of ratification is steady, with many States adopting comprehensive ICC
legislation on cooperation. The future of the ICC depends on all States Parties adopting the
requisite laws that will enable each country to cooperate with the Court. The duty to cooperate
with the ICC imposed on States Parties by the Rome Statute is twofold: a general commitment
to cooperate, and an obligation to amend their domestic laws to permit cooperation with the
Court.

48
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Articles 86 and 88 form the foundation of the obligation on States Parties to cooperate with
the ICC. According to Article 86, ‘States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of
this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court.’51 This general requirement is supplemented by the ICC’s
Rules of Procedure and Evidence52 that govern specific aspects of cooperation in such
contexts as the arrest and surrender of individuals and the collection of evidence. Article 88
obliges States to adopt domestic laws to permit cooperation with the ICC.53

Pursuant to Article 88, a state party has a clear duty to ensure that its national laws provide
guidelines for handling requests for arrest and surrender, and other forms of cooperation. This
duty arises even before a state party even receives a request. The insertion of Article 88 in the
Rome Statute is of central importance because of references to domestic law and procedures
throughout the Statute.54 States are expected to implement Article 88 in good faith, like any
other obligation under the Statute through making of legislative changes at the national level.

The obligation to cooperate with the ICC has been actively incorporated through municipal
mechanisms. States Parties have used several approaches to incorporate the general obligation
to cooperate. Australia and Switzerland opted to include a general provision in their
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Rome Statute, above n 4, art 86.
Finalised draft text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2 November
2000).
53
See Rome Statute, above n 4, art 88. Art 88 provides that ‘States Parties shall ensure that there are procedures
available under their national law for all of the forms of cooperation which are specified under this Part.’ Ibid.
54
For more detail, see Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Adjudication and the Collection of Evidence:
Obligations of States (2002) 194-97.
52
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implementing legislation to cover overall procedures of cooperation.55 Across the Tasman,
New Zealand added a provision to already existing obligations to give judicial assistance and
cooperation that extended these obligations to cover the ICC an approach that had initially
been manifested in Scandinavia through Finland’s implementing legislation.56 Canada
similarly opted for the mechanism of adding a provision to existing regimes of cooperation to
encompass the obligations undertaken under the Rome Statute.57 This is but a brief snapshot
of efforts by States Parties which will be considered in further detail below under specific
heads dealing with the particular nature of cooperation and assistance.

With the steady pace of the ratification of the Rome Statute, it is heartening to note that States
continue to pass the domestic laws necessary to cooperate with the ICC.

Many States have now implemented comprehensive implementing legislation, which includes
provisions regarding incorporating the ICC crimes as well as cooperation obligations. Some have
taken the approach of separating implementing legislation into two parts – one for the introduction of
the crimes and one for the cooperation requirements, reflecting the usual separation between the Code
of Criminal Procedure and the Code of Crimes, in relation to domestic crimes. …States also need to
consider whether they will take this opportunity to go beyond the requirements of the Rome Statute,
which are considered the absolute minimum standards in international law.58

It is very important that all States Parties adopt comprehensive legislation implementing the
obligations under the Rome Statute as this will allow the Court to begin its work without
being repeatedly frustrated by States that do not yet have laws in place that allow them to
55

International Criminal Court Act 2002, Act No 41, 2002, 27 June 2002, Australia, s 3; Federal Law on
Cooperation with the International Criminal Court (CICCL), 22 June 2001, Switzerland (unofficial translation),
art 3.
56
International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000, No 26/2000, assented to 6 September 2000,
New Zealand, s 3, Act on the Implementation of the Provisions of a legislative Nature of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court and on the Application of the Statute, No 1284/2000, issued in Helsinki 28
December 2000, Finland (unofficial translation), s 4.
57
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, SC 2000, C-24, assented to 29 June 2000 entered into force 23
October 2000, Canada, ss 47-53 and 56-69.
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comply.59 The Article now turns to consider under specific heads the various duties to
cooperate which the Rome Statute enshrines, the nature and content of the obligations and
importantly the manner in which States Parties have sought to give effect to the letter and
spirit of their obligations.

B. Investigation and Evidence Gathering
The aim of the Rome Statute and domestic legislation implementing the Rome Statute is to
enable the Court’s investigators to conduct thorough investigations as soon as possible after
the commission of offences. One key element to successful investigations will be the
willingness of States to provide assistance with investigations in a timely manner.
Accordingly, a thorough analysis of the utility of domestic legislation will be possible only
once ICC officials have undertaken an investigation, and the legislation, as well as the State
Party’s willingness to cooperate with the investigation, are put to the test. Before addressing
issues of investigations and evidence gathering, however, it is essential to recall that the Rome
Statute is founded upon the principle of complementarity.60
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International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice & International Centre for Human Rights
and Democratic Development, International Criminal Court: Manual for Ratification and Implementation of the
Rome Statute (2nd ed, 2003) 14.
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See Valerie Oosterveld et al, ‘How the World Will Relate to the Court: The Cooperation of States with the
International Criminal Court’ (2002) 25 Fordham International Law Journal 767.
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Art 17 of the Rome Statute formulates the complementarity regime of the ICC:
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and Article 1, the Court shall determine that a case
is inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided
not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability
of the State genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and
a trial by the Court is not permitted under Article 20, paragraph 3;
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.
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Given the status of the ICC--existing within a regime of complementarity--as a court of ‘last resort,’
the best form of cooperation that States could provide the Court with would be to ensure that their
domestic criminal laws: (1) are sufficient to enable thorough investigations of individuals alleged to
have committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, (2) provide for the indictment and trial of
individuals implicated by evidence of ICC crimes, and (3) are complemented by policies, procedures,
and practices that support investigative and judicial processes.61

Article 88 of the Rome Statute requires that States Parties ensure the existence of procedures
under their domestic law that enable them to cooperate with the Court in investigative and
evidentiary matters.62 This duty exists in addition to the general obligation upon States Parties
to cooperate fully with the ‘investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court.’63 For the purposes of this section, a distinction must be drawn between
investigations commenced pursuant to powers of the Court contained within the Rome Statute
and those initiated by the Security Council. Investigations commenced pursuant to the powers
of the Court are initiated by either States Parties that refer situations to the Court according to
Articles 13(a) and 14 of the Rome Statute, or the Prosecutor launching investigations proprio
motu pursuant to Articles 13(c) and 15. These investigations will be governed by the Rome
Statute and conducted with the assistance of States Parties mandated by Article 86. States that
are not parties to the Rome Statute have no prima facie obligation to cooperate with ICC
investigators.64

The other type of investigation is those triggered by referrals to the ICC by the UN Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Given the Security Council’s overarching authority, the referral to the ICC of cases by the Security Council could arguably

Rome Statute, above n 4, art 17(1). Art 17 of the Rome Statute proceeds to specify the factors the Court must
consider when determining whether a State is indeed unwilling or unable to proceed. Ibid art 17(2), 17(3).
61
Oosterveld et al, above n 59 at 775.
62
See Rome Statute, above n 4, art 88.
63
Ibid art 86; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, UN Doc A/Conf 39/28, UKTS
58 (1980), 8 ILM 679, art 26.
64
However, it should be noted that pursuant to art 87(5) of the Rome Statute, the Court may invite a non-Party
State to provide assistance in an investigation on an ad hoc basis. See Rome Statute, above n 3, art 87(5).
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permit investigators to obtain the assistance of Member States that are not parties to the Rome
Statute. Taken to the extreme, Security Council referrals would allow the ICC to operate
under Chapter VII in a manner similar to the ICTFY and the ICTR.65 The Court’s ability to
obtain the assistance of States in the conducting of such rigorous investigations is mandated
under Article 54(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, which empowers the Prosecutor to ‘[s]eek the
cooperation of any State.’66 The Prosecutor is directed to conduct investigations on the
territory of a State in accordance with the provisions of Part 9.67

Article 93 of the Rome Statute reaffirms the obligation of States Parties to comply with
requests for assistance from the Court, in accordance with the provisions of Part 9 of the
Rome Statute and pursuant to their national procedures.68 Part 9 identifies the many precise
forms of cooperation that States Parties are obliged to provide to the Court, and refers
specifically to the production of evidence. States Parties are required to facilitate the ICC’s
requests for assistance in, inter alia, identifying and tracking persons or things;69 taking
evidence and testimony under oath as well as producing evidence;70 questioning individuals;71
examining places or sites, and exhuming and examining grave sites; executing searches and
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See William A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2001) 101, where it is suggested
that the issues of admissibility criteria and complementarity following a Security Council referral have been left
(perhaps intentionally) unresolved. See also Jelena Pejic, ‘The International Criminal Court Statute: An
Appraisal of the Rome Package’ (2000) International Law 65.
66
Rome Statute, above n 4, art 54(3)(c).
67
See ibid art 54(2)(a). Art 54(2)(b) deals with an exception to the general requirement to obtain a State’s
cooperation in the conduct of investigations. The subparagraph refers to paragraph 57(3)(d), pursuant to which
the Pre-Trial Chamber may authorise the Prosecutor to conduct specified investigations on the territory of a State
Party without that State’s cooperation in situations where the State is ‘clearly unable to execute a request for
cooperation due to the unavailability of any [State organ] ... competent to execute the request for cooperation
under Part 9.’ Ibid art 57(3)(d).
68
Ibid art 93. Art 96 establishes guidelines for the contents of requests. See ibid art 96. Art 99 governs the
execution of requests ‘in accordance with the relevant provisions under the law of the requested State and, unless
prohibited by such law, in the manner specified in the request.’ Ibid art 99. Art 100 stipulates that costs, other
than those exempted by this Article, are to be borne by the requested State. See ibid art 100.
69
See ibid art 93(1)(a).
70
See ibid art 93(1)(b).
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See ibid art 93(1)(c).

20

seizures; effecting the provision of records and documents;72 and guaranteeing the
preservation of evidence.73 The list of these means of cooperation concludes with a blanket
clause that obligates States Parties to provide all other types of assistance ‘not prohibited by
the law of the requested State’ and which will facilitate investigations or prosecutions.74
Bending to sovereignty considerations, conspicuously absent is any subpoena power. That is,
neither the judges nor the Prosecutor of the ICC (or defence counsel, presumably) appear to
have any power to compel witnesses to appear.75

As established by this elaboration of relevant provisions, the Rome Statute establishes an
extensive regime governing the conduct of investigations, the collection of evidence in ICC
proceedings, and the forms of cooperation required from States Parties to make them
effective. Until States Parties incorporate their obligations under the Rome Statute to assist the
Court into their domestic laws and procedures and enable ICC investigations to be conducted
within their territories, the Prosecutor’s most fundamental efforts to conduct thorough
investigations in accordance with Article 54 will be stymied.

The practical ICC legislative initiatives of some of the States that have implemented their
obligations to cooperate with the ICC in investigations and evidence collection are
particularly important as examples to States that have yet to ratify and implement the Rome
Statute.76 Two broad approaches seem to have been followed by states. First, simply adding
these obligations to the ICC to the list of entities from which the State can entertain request
72

See ibid art 93(1)(i).
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75
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for assistance and secondly the passage of ICC specific legislation which puts in place the
necessary administrative and procedural mechanisms for cooperation. A look at the
implementing legislation of the UK, Canada and Switzerland readily exhibits the character of
these two approaches.

Canada and the UK adopted single omnibus bill that addresses both the criminal and
administrative requirements of the ICC.77 The provisions in the Canada Act that amend the
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (‘MLA Act’),78 allow Canada to provide
assistance to the ICC in investigations and evidence gathering in manners similar to the way
in which Canada currently provides assistance to States and other entities. The MLA Act not
only provides the power to assist the ICC with searches and seizures of evidence but also the
power to order questioning in Canada.79 The UK’s procedural approach in this area largely
mirrors that of Canada except that the UK specifically enacted legislation to entertain requests
from the ICC.80 The Swiss approach conforms to the UK approach in so far as it enacted
specific legislation81 addressing the modes of cooperation with the ICC but does not
incorporate this through existing laws.82 Instead, Swiss Civil Law establishes a Central
Authority in the Federal Office of Justice that determines the form and manner in which
Switzerland will comply with requests for assistance from the ICC.83
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C. Arrest and Surrender
Criminal prosecution is inherently tied to notions of national sovereignty and the control over
persons and territory which are fundamental to that notion. In fact, some argue that the
Nuremberg tribunal itself succeeded only because it in some ways substituted itself for the
inability of the German government to try war criminals with the obstacle of sovereignty of
the German State as a bar to the enforcement of justice having been destroyed by the historic
events of May and June, 1945. Arguably, the successful establishment of the Yugoslavia and
Rwanda tribunals represents a fundamental departure from Nuremberg in that the authority
under which they were constituted derives not from their status as occupied territories, but
from the exercise of international power by the Security Council.84 More importantly, the ad
hoc international criminal tribunals establish an international cooperation regime that obliges
States individually and collectively to arrest and surrender. Like these two bodies, the ICC
will rely on the goodwill of States in discharging both their legal and discretionary arrest and
surrender obligations.

The obligation on States Parties to arrest and surrender accused is found in several articles of
the Rome Statute. The general Article 86 obligation to ‘cooperate fully with the Court in its
investigation and prosecution of crimes’85 is supplemented by Article 89, which specifically
addresses ‘surrender of persons to the Court.’86 Under Article 89(1), the Court can transmit a
request for the arrest and surrender of a person, together with material supporting that
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Nonetheless, both the Yugoslavia and the Rwanda tribunals were constituted in the midst of continuing
national disarray, where the functioning national legal system had been subverted and compromised and could
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request,87 to a State on the territory of which that person may be found. The Statute is clear as
to the obligation of States Parties upon receiving such a request: they must comply.88 The
implementation of a request for arrest and surrender is governed by both Article 59 and the
relevant provisions of Part 9 of the Statute. Whereas Part 9 contains essentially obligations
that give effect to the request, Article 59 contains the method of implementation.89 The
procedure for States Parties to execute requests to arrest and surrender individuals in their
territories is straightforward: the Court transmits the request together with the supporting
material required by Article 91 of the Rome Statute. Upon receipt of requests from the ICC,
States Parties follow their domestic laws, which must be in accordance with the provisions of
the Rome Statute. Rule 184 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence stipulates that requested
States must immediately inform the ICC’s Registrar in the event persons under indictment of
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See ibid art 89(1). Art 91 outlines the kind of written material that must accompany the request for arrest and
surrender.
In the case of a request for the arrest and surrender of a person for whom a warrant of arrest has been
issued by the [ICC’s] Pre-Trial Chamber ... the request shall contain or be supported by:
(a) Information describing the person sought, sufficient to identify the person, and information as to
that person’s probable location;
(b) A copy of the warrant of arrest; and
(c) Such documents, statements or information as may be necessary to meet the requirements for the
surrender process in the requested State.
Ibid art 91(2). In the case of a person already convicted by the ICC but who has escaped, the request
must contain:
(a) A copy of any warrant for arrest of that person;
(b) A copy of the judgement of conviction;
(c) Information to demonstrate that the person sought is the one referred to in the judgement of
conviction; and
(d) If the person sought has been sentenced, a copy of the sentence imposed and, in the case of a
sentence for imprisonment, a statement of any time already served and the time remaining to be
served.

Ibid art 91(3).
See ibid art 89(1) (‘States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and the procedure under
their national law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender.’).
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the Court are available for surrender.90 States and the Registrar must agree on the date and
manner of the surrender.91 However as straightforward as these provisions appear, they were
the result of serious debate and compromise.

1. Arrest
In the overwhelming majority of cases, national authorities must arrest the person before they
surrender the person for the purpose of prosecution.92 Article 58 regulates the issuance of an
arrest warrant. The Pre-Trial Chamber is designated to issue arrest warrants.93 Here, the
Statute is consistent with international human rights instruments and the practice in many
national criminal jurisdictions because judicial intervention is required to deprive a person of
his or her liberty.94

As in many national criminal jurisdictions, the conditions under which the Pre-Trial Chamber
must issue an arrest warrant are twofold. First, the prosecutor must show there are ‘reasonable
grounds’ to believe the person concerned committed a crime within the court’s jurisdiction.95
Second, the person must be arrested for a specific purpose.96 The Rome Statute’s conditions
for the issuance of an arrest warrant are stricter than the ICTY and ICTR Statutes. The latter
instruments, or the applicable Rules of Procedure and Evidence do not contain the condition
90
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of necessity.

97

Pursuant to Article 58(1)(a), the Prosecutor must meet the burden of proving

‘reasonable grounds.’ Although the ‘reasonable grounds’ standard is the minimum standard
under Article 58, the actual standard applied by the Pre-Trial Chamber, however, may be
more demanding. Article 58(1)(b) further lists three alternative purposes that the arrest should
serve. These include ensuring the person’s appearance at trial (since trial there can be no trial
in absentia), prevent interference with investigations and to prevent further or continuing
commission of an offence within the Court’s jurisdiction.98

Certain provisions of the Rome Statute governing arrest and surrender are directly related to
the actions States Parties must undertake in specific circumstances. These situations include
procedures for arrest and surrender as well as provisional arrest, challenges by an accused or a
State of the admissibility or jurisdiction of the Court, the actual surrender of individuals and
their transit through the territories of States Parties, and instances of competing requests for
arrest and surrender. Although States Parties will be required to adapt their national law to
ensure that they are able to fulfil their cooperation obligations under the Statute,99 a
significant residual role remains for national law which will continue to control the form and
procedure governing requests for assistance,100 as well as the execution of such requests, with
very limited exceptions.101
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During the negotiation of the Rome Statute, States disagreed as to the process that should be
used to arrest and bring persons before the Court. The term ‘arrest’ raised the question as to
whether States could use their national custodial powers or would need to follow ICC-specific
arrest procedures to take individuals into custody. This question was linked to the issue of
cooperation more generally: for some, national laws varied so much that use of those laws
could conceivably limit the Court’s ability to discharge its basic functions, whereas for others,
any derogation from their national laws would be deemed unacceptable as an invasion of
sovereignty.102 Article 58(5) of the Rome Statute connects the issuance of the arrest warrant
with the issuance of a request for arrest and surrender to a state. According to this provision,
the court may issue such a request under Part 9, only after an arrest warrant has been issued
under Article 58.103 Part 9 contains the regulations and conditions pertaining to the issuance
and transmission of requests for an arrest and surrender, with one important exception: the
provisions under Part 9 are procedural.

The procedural requirements are set out in Articles 87 and 91 of the Statute. Sections 1 and 2
of Article 87 contain regulations on the channel of communications and the choice of
languages regarding requests for assistance. According to Article 87(1)(a), requests for
assistance shall be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or any other appropriate
channel designated by each state party. The language of the request shall be in the official
language of the requested state or one of the court’s working languages, as the state party

102
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chooses.104 These regulations are similar to those in the Inter-State Cooperation Model.105 It is
clearly a concession to states in favour of a more horizontal oriented cooperation model.106

2. Surrender
At Rome, in the face of serious concerns with regard to sovereignty, the crucial point was to
decide whether or not arrest and delivery of suspects would be carried out within the
framework of extradition or rather a new method had to be worked out. Some countries
argued for a simple transfer mechanism, where they could send a person to the ICC with little
or no domestic process. Other countries fearful of granting too many concessions to the Court
argued for the use of extradition, especially to transfer nationals. A majority of countries,
however, argued for a sui generis approach. ‘The Polish delegation suggested that a more
structured and a better methodological approach be adopted towards this problem that would
reflect what the Roman jurists had taught a couple of thousand years earlier: bene docet qui
bene distinguit.’107 It was recommended that the solution should include the following steps:

1. to distinguish clearly between extradition and surrender by pointing to fundamental differences
between them
2. to define surrender as a genuine and unique form of cooperation between States and the
International Criminal Court; and
3. to frame this form accordingly by specifying its constituent elements with due consideration to the
specific nature, organisation, and jurisdiction as well as the needs of the ICC.108

‘From the outset, it was obvious that broadly speaking there [were] two options to solve this
problem: either to maintain extradition (straight [“regular”] or somewhat modified) or to
104
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create a new form of delivery of a “body of a criminal,” different and separate from
extradition.’109 States eventually agreed to a compromise under which the Rome Statute
would refer both to specific obligations for arrest and surrender and acknowledge procedures
in existence under domestic laws.110 The solution adopted was to oblige States to ‘surrender’
persons to the Court, with the procedure to be followed left to the individual States, subject to
certain limitations.111 The compromise is reflected in Article 102 which states that for the
purposes of the Statute, ‘surrender’ means the delivering up of a person by a State to the
Court, pursuant to this Statute, whereas ‘extradition’ means the delivering up of a person by
one State to another as provided by treaty, convention, or national legislation.112 Thus
‘surrender’ as a process through which States turn over individuals to the ICC is a process
quite different from extradition, which takes place only between States. It is significant that
States agreed to create a process for the ICC that is more streamlined than State-to-State
extradition.113

Accordingly, under Article 91(2)(c) of the Rome Statute, the procedural

requirements imposed by States for the surrender of persons to the ICC:

should not be more burdensome than those applicable to requests for extradition pursuant to treaties or
arrangements between the requested State and other States and should, if possible, be less
burdensome, taking into account the distinct nature of the Court.114
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‘The main intent of this exercise was to free the ‘surrender’ from a host of conditions,
restrictions, and requirements which, developed in other epochs and designed for different
purposes, are inappropriate in the context of the ICC. Exceptions, exclusions, and exemptions
traditionally have been the main obstacle to make extradition a fully effective tool in the fight
against crime. To strengthen ‘surrender’ and render it more efficient, the number and scope of
grounds for refusal by the requested State had to be significantly restricted. … by removing
from the Statute ALL grounds for refusal of ‘surrender.’115 If we accept that the provisions
pertaining to surrender have in fact removed all possible grounds for refusal, then we would
have to conclude that the authorities of the requested State, being unable to invoke any bar to
‘surrender’ or ‘transfer,’ are placed in an awkward position of either violating their domestic
law or violating their international obligation. That would also mean that the principle aut
dedere aut judicare has been replaced with by a mandatory requirement of transfer
(dedere).116

Certain complications are raised by the ‘surrender’ regime under the Rome Statute. Most
significant is the complication of constitutional prohibitions on extradition of nationals to a
foreign jurisdiction that are to be found in many constitutions. The question is whether such
prohibitions are consistent with the obligation of State Parties to surrender suspects to the
ICC. Because the ICC will not prosecute in absentia, the Court must gain physical control
over a suspect for a trial to take place. The apparent tension between constitutional
prohibitions against extradition of nationals and ICC obligations diminishes upon a closer
examination of the fundamental conceptual differences between ‘surrender’ to an
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international criminal court and ‘extradition’ to another State.117 Article 102 of the Statute
defines ‘surrender’ as ‘the delivering up of a person by a State to the Court’ and extradition as
‘the delivering up of a person by one State to another.’118 This distinction between extradition
and surrender is not merely semantic but substantive.

In common law countries, the possibility of surrendering nationals to the ICC does not
necessitate adoption of any particular legislative measures other than the one that would
facilitate the surrender of the individual to the ICC. It is with civil law countries that a real
problem emerges since most of these countries contain constitutional prohibitions against
extradition of nationals. However, it is worthy of note that the creators of such constitutional
prohibitions contemplated ‘horizontal cooperation’ between national courts and not ‘vertical
cooperation’ with an international court. As the ICC is not a ‘foreign court’ or ‘foreign
jurisdiction,’ but rather an international one, the constitutional prohibitions against extradition
may not apply. Given the flexibility provided by the Rome Statute, States have two options
when implementing the obligation to surrender individuals to the ICC: create a separate legal
procedure or amend existing extradition laws.

Many States have had to pass new laws or adapt existing national laws in order to provide
clear authority for surrendering fugitives to the ICC. The adaptation of national law in order
to transfer nationals to the ICC proved much more complicated in a great number of States
because most of the constitutions--except those of the Anglo-American system--contain a
prohibition against the extradition of nationals.
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Civil law countries have opted for three approaches (1) amending the constitution, (2)
adopting an interpretative approach and (3) a general, centralized model that favours
procedural mechanisms. In the first approach, reflected by Germany, States have effected
minor amendments ‘aimed only at including an exception to the principle, to ensure that the
Constitution is not breached by the surrender of a national to the ICC. The advantage of a
constitutional amendment with a specific reference to the ICC is that it erases any possibility
of a normative conflict at the national level.’119 In the second approach, States such as Costa
Rica, Ecuador and Ukraine have largely interpreted the Constitutional prohibition against
extradition of one’s own national in light of the need to conform to international law
considering that the ICC represents the international community and is established with their
consent.120 The third approach is manifest in Swiss Civil Law.121 The law establishes a Central
Authority in the Federal Office of Justice which handles all ICC requests for cooperation and
requests for surrender.122 The Central Authority is administered through the Federal Office of
Justice, to which responsibility is delegated to, inter alia, surrender to the Court persons being
prosecuted and transmit the results of the execution of the request.123 Article 5 of the Swiss
Civil Law mandates that cantonal and federal authorities perform all measures ordered by the
Central Authority to cooperate with the Court and the means prescribed by the Central
Authority to implement requests from the ICC must be executed expeditiously without being
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subjected to the substantive procedures of the designated cantonal or federal authority.124
Virtually no restriction exists as to the means by which requests are conveyed.

Summing up the approach by civil law countries, most Continental Europe civil law countries
provide for minimal judicial involvement of domestic courts. Generally, once a person
resident in the State against whom an indictment has been confirmed has been taken into
custody and informed of the charges against him/her by the examining court, transfer to the
ICC shall be approved without the need for formal extradition proceedings and without any
need to conduct proceedings and invoke the substantive requirements often specified by
domestic laws on extradition. Even in States where courts may be consulted concerning
requests for transfer, the degree of judicial review ranges simply from perfunctory
identification of suspects to limited evidentiary review.

Surprisingly, it is Anglo-American countries that are keen to ensure that ‘surrender’ requests
from the ICC are subjected to certain domestic safeguards. For instance in the UK more
extensive examination is required by law, which contemplates extradition-like proceedings in
courts. The surrender provisions of the UK Act reads to some extent like a streamlined
bilateral albeit one that enables surrender in only one direction: from the UK to the ICC.125
The process implemented by the UK Act is based on legislation originally drafted for the swift
transfer of suspects between the United Kingdom and Ireland, which became the model for
the arrest and surrender of suspects to the ICTY and ICTR.126 Warrant applications brought
by constables will include statements under oath that they have reason to believe that a
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request for arrest has been made by the ICC and that the person is in, or en route to, the
United Kingdom. Upon the successful bringing of an application, an appropriate judicial
officer shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the person identified in the warrant127 and notify
the Secretary of State. A ‘reasonable basis’ (comparable to ‘probable cause,’ the evidentiary
standard in UK courts) standard must be satisfied before extradition requests may be certified.

The UK is not alone in clinging to some form of domestic safeguard. In Canada, the Canada
Act addresses arrest and surrender by amending the Extradition Act128 to include a separate
procedure for the surrender of persons to the ICC, which is, in essence, a shortened, modified
version of the extradition process. This approach, as opposed to creating a sui generis
procedure, was taken as the Extradition Act had been amended one year earlier to include
surrender to the ICTFY129 and the ICTR.130 In addition, Canada’s extradition process has
passed constitutional adjudication by the Supreme Court, and the creation of a streamlined
surrender process for the ICC within existing Canadian extradition law is more likely to
accord with established constitutional standards.131 This surrender process for the ICC was
created through several amendments to the Extradition Act. Similarly other common law
countries for instance Australia and New Zealand provide for surrender determinations to be
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made by the Attorney-General who, in both countries, has discretion to refuse requests in
‘special’ (Australia) or ‘exceptional’ (New Zealand) ‘circumstances.’132

Whether the significant new regime of ‘surrender’ would be successful depends first and
foremost on the reaction of States, governments, and their national legislatures to the concept
of ‘surrender.’ It is heartening to note that many States both common and civil law regard
‘surrender’ as a genuine, per se form of delivering up the requested persons to the ICC and
have convinced their parliaments to adopt the relevant national law and to amend the existing
statutes. Article 102 seems poised to be a great success.

3.Transit on Third Party Territory
In pushing back the barriers of sovereignty, the Rome Statute and ICC’s Rules of Procedure
and Evidence oblige States to take certain action with regard to arresting persons and
surrendering them to the Court. Accordingly, States must be able to cooperate with the ICC in
these areas in order to ensure an effective Court through the enactment of ICC specific
national legislation.

The Rome Statute provides for the practical reality that, on many occasions, persons being
surrendered to the Court cannot be taken directly from their points of arrest to the ICC’s
detention facilities in The Hague without transiting through one or more States. If transit
through the territory of a State Party is required, under Article 89(3), that State Party must
authorize, in accordance with its domestic law and procedures, transportation of the person,
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unless transit through the State would impede or delay surrender.133 The person being
transported must be detained in custody during the entirety of the transit process. The Court
will need to seek voluntary cooperation for transiting persons through the territories of nonStates Parties, as the Rome Statute does not bind them.

Considering that many States do not have legislation permitting the detention of a person
being transported, implementing legislation needs to come in once again to smooth the way.
The Manual for Ratification and Implementation identifies two mechanisms seen in existing
legislation: (1) amendment of existing domestic legislation and

(2) establishment of a

separate regime in implementing legislation134

The first approach is manifest in Canadian legislation which amends domestic legislation to
ensure compliance with Article 89.135 Australia and New Zealand fall in the second category
with provisions which mirror Article 89.136 The Manual for Ratification and Implementation
identifies that the provisions in the New Zealand legislation incorporate the obligations set out
in Article 89 and include self-contained procedures in dealing with persons in transit.137 The
Australian and UK legislation largely mirror the provisions in the New Zealand legislation.
However, the UK legislation treats the request as though they were ordinary requests for
arrest and surrender except that the circumstances render this to be an expedited process.138
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4. Competing Requests
A complication relates to competing requests between the Court and States. In contrast to the
ad hoc tribunals, the ICC does not take priority over other international obligations, such as
that provided for in Article 103 of the UN Charter. Article 90 on ‘competing requests’
addresses the possibility that a State Party (the requested State) might receive a request from
the ICC and from a State not Party to the Statute (the requesting State) for surrender of the
same person.139 Requests are ‘competing’ if fulfilling one would prevent a State from
fulfilling the other: a State cannot simultaneously extradite a person to another State and
surrender that same person to the ICC. Despite the potential for a State to receive mutually
exclusive requests along these lines, not all competition is deemed problematic under Article
90. ‘In particular, certain apparently mutually exclusive requests may in fact come under the
heading of “false competitions”--that is, situations involving no real conflict among a
requested State’s existing obligations, and thus no real competition.’140

Simultaneous requests by the ICC and a requesting State may create a true competition if and
when the ICC determines that the case is admissible. If extradition of an individual to the
requesting State and surrender to the ICC are not sought for the same conduct, then the ICC’s
request has priority if the requested State has no existing international obligation to extradite
the person to the requesting State (a false competition).141 If extradition and surrender are
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sought for the same conduct (a true competition), then the requested State must make a
decision based on factors included but not limited to those enumerated in Article 90, ‘but [the
requested State] shall give special consideration to the relative nature and gravity of the
conduct in question.’142 The goal of the regime set out in Article 90 is not to ensure that all
persons responsible for international crimes are tried before the ICC. Rather, it is to ensure
that they are tried before a competent court and are subject to protections and penalties that
meet international standards.

D. Enforcement of the Duty to Cooperate
Article 87 of the Rome Statute sets out the general provisions governing requests by the ICC
for cooperation with investigations and includes recourse for the Court in the event that States
Parties fail to comply with its requests. Upon a finding by the Court of failure by a State Party
to cooperate, the dispute may be referred to either the Assembly of States Parties or to the UN
Security Council for resolution.143 Similar to requests for arrest and surrender, the terms of the
Rome Statute mandating cooperation with the Court in a general capacity are equally relevant
to demands for cooperation in investigations and for the collection of evidence. Article 87(7)
confirms the ICC’s power to issue judicial findings for disputes over the extent of the duty to
cooperate.144

Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute, a clear process exists for inducing a party
state’s compliance with a request for assistance. The ICC may make a judicial finding of non-
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compliance where a party state fails to comply with a request to cooperate with the ICC.
Commenting on the efficacy of such a finding, Dr Goran Sluiter observes that:

A judicial finding of non-cooperation is dual in character. It is an enforcement measure. As such, the
impact of an impartial international judicial body establishing that a state has breached its obligations
under an international treaty should not be underestimated. Such a finding, establishing a noncooperating state’s illegal actions, may induce its compliance. Second, a judicial finding of noncompliance satisfies the vital prerequisite to submit the matter to those institutional bodies designated
to enforce the Statute.145

Article 95 of the Rome Statute however allows a state to postpone the execution of a request
pending the determination by the court of the case’s admissibility pursuant to Article 18 or 19
of the Statute. The provision puts the principle of complementarity into effect. According to
this principle, prosecution should take place at the national level and the court may only
exercise jurisdiction if a state is unwilling or unable to prosecute a case. According to Article
95, until it is certain that the court may actually exercise jurisdiction, there is no need to assist
the court.

Though the Rome Statute expressly allows the requested state to postpone the provision of
legal assistance under certain conditions, this is not the same as a ground for refusing
assistance. ‘The latter, if accepted by the court, is final. The former, however, may
temporarily suspend the duty to provide assistance. It regains its force when the “conditions
of postponement” are no longer applicable. The difference between refusal and postponement
may only be marginal in practice, particularly if it concerns a request that begs for swift
execution.’146 The main ground for refusal addresses the right to postpone legal services but
in extrapolation, the ground for postponement has a significant positive effect for effective
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legal assistance generally in that it underlines that the “general rule” is immediate execution
of requests, and postponement is the exception.147

E. Immunity & Exclusive Jurisdiction
Article 98, entitled ‘Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to
surrender,’ has proved to be a battleground between States that seek to limit the ICC’s
freedom of action and States (notably the US) that seek to affirm the superiority of sovereign
consent. Article 98 of the Rome Statute, provides that the court may not proceed with a
request for surrender or assistance that would require the requested state to act inconsistently
with its obligations under international law. The state must respect a third state’s diplomatic
immunity. ‘Article 98 of the Rome Statute, as a ground to refuse assistance, recognises
protections flowing from international obligations relating to diplomatic or state immunity.
Additionally, it recognises those obligations arising from an agreement, such as Status of
Forces agreements. These latter agreements provide exclusive jurisdiction over troops
stationed in another state.’148

In particular, Article 98(1) contemplates a situation in which the ICC seeks surrender or
assistance that ‘would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations
under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or
property of a third State.’149 Article 98(2) addresses a special instance of true competition: a
situation in which a request for surrender from the ICC overlaps with a pre-existing obligation
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that the requested State has under an international agreement with a third State to ‘extradite’
or ‘surrender’ individuals to the sending State. More specifically, Article 98(2) envisages the
possibility that a member of a non-State Party’s armed forces present in the territory of a State
Party might be subject to a request for surrender by the ICC that conflicts with the requested
State’s treaty obligation not to extradite the person under a State-to-State agreement, typically
a Status of Force Agreement (SOFA), between the requested State and the non-State Party. 150

‘Although the United States supports the ideals embodied in the Rome Statute, it [was]
determined to obtain an exemption from the Court’s jurisdiction for members of its armed
forces and officials. During the closing hours of the Rome Conference, delegates
overwhelmingly voted down US amendments to the Statute to secure this exemption. The
United States [felt] vulnerable to political attack through the Court because of its military
deployment across the globe and its international role as peacekeeper.’151 At Rome, the US
delegation sought to address these concerns and shield US military personnel from the
Court’s jurisdiction. The delegation scored a major triumph with the successful negotiation of
Article 98 of the Rome Statute.152 Article 98(2) states:

The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested Stateto act
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a
sending State required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain
the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.153
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The article aims to restrict the ICC’s power to indict and try military personnel by codifying a
certain deference to State-to-State agreements such as SOFAs and extradition treaties.154 The
use of Article 98 as a likely ground to restrict the ICC was soon at the centre of the US
campaign to ensure its nationals remain beyond the reach of the ICC. Soon after the
conclusion of the Rome Conference and the adoption of the Rome Statute,

The United States saw the drafting of the Rules of Procedure as a potential opening for continued
attempts to ensure that no US citizen could be haled before the ICC for crimes committed on the
territory of a State Party to the Rome Statute. In particular, the US delegation focused on article 98(2)
as a hook for an expanded interpretation of what kinds of “international agreements” might act as
limits on the ICC’s ability to request the surrender of an individual, without first attempting to secure
155
the consent of that person’s State of citizenship.

The US proposed a rule that read as follows: “The Court shall proceed with a request for
surrender or an acceptance of a person into the custody of the Court only in a manner
consistent with international agreements applicable to the surrender of the person.”156 Peeling
back the legal façade of the proposal, Dr Chimene Keitner, astutely observes that:

This underlying agenda or “fundamental requirement” was, and remains, obtaining a guarantee that no
US citizen will be subject to ICC jurisdiction under any circumstances as long as the US remains a
non-Party to the Rome Statute. As part of an exemption strategy, the US proposed rule is inconsistent
with the intended scope of article 98(2), and with the spirit of the Rome Statute. Exempting the
nationals of any country from the jurisdiction of the ICC stands in fundamental opposition to the
ideals of international justice and to the affirmation of universal jurisdiction over the most serious
157
international crimes.

Eventually a modified version of the US rule was adopted by the Fifth PrepCom as rule
195(2) in the Finalized Draft Text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. It is important to
note that ‘The discussions of rule 195(2) during the Fifth PrepCom served to clarify the
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nature, scope, and purpose of article 98(2), an article that had not previously been a focus of
attention.’158

States can however take unilateral steps in relation to the protections that SOFAs already
provide consistent with the treaty including re-opening SOFAs to accomplish this objective.
‘Article 98 places international treaty obligations in a position superior to requests or orders
from the Court for surrender or delivery of a suspect. As a result, states can intentionally
create international obligations that compete or conflict with the Court’s request for surrender
for the sole purpose of avoiding its jurisdiction. Effectively, Article 98 supports current
treaties and allows for the negotiation of future treaties or international agreements that would
secure a state’s jurisdiction over its citizens to supersede ICC jurisdiction.’159 There is a
strong argument though by treaty proponents that ICC jurisdiction is a freestanding,
independent right and that the Receiving State can exercise its own discretion by transferring
persons to the ICC, even in the face of a SOFA provision.160 This is echoed by Dr Chimene
Keitner who identifies an important bulwark against any bad faith efforts by noting that:

The rule [195(2)] to article 98(2) is consistent with the Statute as long as it is read strictly in
conjunction with the article itself, and with the prevailing understanding of the nature of the
agreements at issue accepted at Rome and clarified during the PrepCom (that is, agreements between
the sending State and the requested State, creating an international obligation on the requested
State).161

However when the United States delegation successfully negotiated the inclusion of the Rule
195(2) in relation to Article 98(2) in the Rome Statute, it had in mind its SOFAs and their
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applicability.162 Thus Article 98(2) contains arguments waiting to be plucked by States into
their SOFAs and ensure that their service members are not surrendered to the Court.163 The
US determination to use Article 98(2) towards political as opposed to legal imperatives was
soon manifest. On 30 June 2002, the United States vetoed a six-month extension of the UN
peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.164 This veto blocked a resolution supported by thirteen of the
fifteen members of the Security Council. As a result, members of the Security Council
acquiesced to the US request and granted all peacekeepers from States not parties to the Rome
Statute participating in the Bosnia mission blanket protection from ICC prosecution for one
year.165

Although article 98(2) seems to codify a certain deference to State-to-State agreements such
as SOFAs, which are drafted and adopted to facilitate military operations by one State in the
territory of another, the Article is far more comprehensive viewed in its context as well as
broader international law. ‘The reference to the third State in this scenario as the “sending
State” (as opposed to “State not Party to this Statute,” the term used in the other provisions of
Part 9) indicates that the drafters of the Rome Statute were concerned with a particular
scenario in article 98: the possible interference by the ICC with operations conducted by the
armed forces or personnel of a non- State Party in the territory of a State Party. Note,
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however, that this “interference” would presumably consist of deterrence, investigation, and,
if necessary, prosecution of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity in cases
where the sending State or the requested State was itself unwilling or unable to investigate or
prosecute.’166 Thus a literal reading suggests that objections to jurisdiction on any basis other
than the requested State’s own willingness to investigate and prosecute the crimes in question
constitute a breach of the requested State’s existing obligations under international law.167

Under the ICC regime, the deployment of a non-StateParty’s troops on the territory of a State
Party would continue to be governed by existing agreements under which the
sending/contributing State retains criminal jurisdiction over its own soldiers on such
missions.168 However, as Dr Chimene Keitner notes: ‘This arrangement is a feature of, not a
limit on, the ICC’s complementary jurisdiction: the ICC would only request cooperation or
surrender of a person if those States also possessing jurisdiction proved unwilling or unable to
exercise it.’169 The end result thus appears to be that military personnel will be free from ICC
prosecution so long as their State of origin investigates and properly prosecutes any potential
crimes they may have committed. On the negative side, past history points to a string of

166

Keitner, above n 8 at 233-234. For a detailed discussion, see James Crawford et al, ‘In the Matter of the
Statute of the International Criminal Court and in the Matter of Bilateral Agreements Sought by the United
States Under Article 98(2) of The Statute’, an opinion prepared for the Lawater’s Committee on Human Rights
and the Medical foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture. This opinion can be accessed at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/international_justice/Art98_061403.pdf (visited 15 March 2004).
167
See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
arts 4 and 12, GA Res 39/46, Annex, 39 UN GAOR Supp (No 51) at 197, UN Doc A/39/51 (1984), 1465 UNTS
85 (entered into force June 26, 1987); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
arts 1 and 5, GA Res 260(III), UN GAOR, 3rd Sess, pt 1, at 174, UN Doc A/810 (1948), 78 UNTS 277 (entered
into force 12 January 1951).
168
In the event of hostilities, the Contracting Parties to a SOFA will generally review the jurisdictional
provisions, and may also exercise the right to suspend the application of any of the provisions of the SOFA. See,
e.g. Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, 19 June
1951, art 15, UST 1792.
169
Keitner, above note 8 at 235.

45

failures by sending states to investigate alleged war crimes by its military personnel serving in
peacekeeping missions.170

Currently the United States is pursuing a policy of negotiating treaties with each ICC member
state to grant immunity to US military personnel. The Bush Administration is intent on
continuing such a policy even in the face of bitter opposition by the European Union.171 In
sum,
The ‘fundamental objective’ of the US in the ICC negotiations [was] and remains, ‘to prevent, unless
certain conditions are met, the surrender to or acceptance by the ICC for trial of nationals of non-party
States who are acting under governmental direction and whose actions are acknowledged as such by
the non-party State.’ This sought-after exemption would even preclude a non-party national from
surrendering voluntarily to the ICC, an unprecedented restriction on the possibility of selfsurrender.172

However, reality is not as simple as the US rationale and the agreements might seem to
suggest. It is the very thing that the US seeks to safeguard that ultimately stands in the waysovereignty. The principle of territorial sovereignty or territorial supremacy establishes that a
State has ‘exclusive competence to take legal and factual measures within a territory and
prohibit foreign governments from exercising authority in the same area without consent.’173
In Wilson v Girard174 the US Supreme Court citing The Schooner Exchange v McFadden
held, ‘a sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offences against its laws
committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its
jurisdiction.’ Recent state practice shows that States are keen to retain jurisdictional
prerogative whether pursuant to domestic or to international obligations. For instance in
170
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Netherlands v Short,175 an American soldier charged with murder was only released to US
authorities upon an undertaking that he would not be subject him to the death penalty since
such an action would violate the Dutch court’s responsibilities under the European
Convention on Human Rights.176 It is not hard then to picture that a State Party to the ICC
even in the face of a SOFA has obligations under the Rome Statute grounded in international
law that would override a SOFAs which simply seeks to circumvent the ICC.177

F. Enforcement of Forfeiture Orders and ICC Fines
The Rome Statute enables the ICC to issue orders for the forfeiture of property considered to
be derived from crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction. In order to effect forfeiture, the Court is
also empowered to issue orders freezing assets that are the proceeds of crime178 located within
the territories of States Parties. The Rome Statute also permits orders for the forfeiture of
individuals’ property derived from crime179 to be imposed as part of the sentence, either in
and of themselves or in addition to prison terms, that may be imposed by the Court on
individuals convicted of crimes within its jurisdiction.180 Finally, in terms of enforcement of
the Court’s financial punitive powers, the ICC represents an innovation in international
criminal sanction as the first-ever international tribunal explicitly empowered to impose
fines181 against individuals.182 All of these important powers of the criminal judicial process
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allotted to the Court by the Rome Statute must be affirmed nationally by its States Parties in
order to be enforceable and thereby have an efficient and effective ICC. With regard to
enabling the ICC to be proactive and to have an additional means by which to combat
international crime by seizing the proceeds of crime more generally, the Rome Statute
empowers the Court to order measures to effect its orders for forfeiture of the proceeds of
crimes within its jurisdiction.183

Orders for forfeiture are also available under the Rome Statute. Article 77(2) addresses the
Court’s ability to order forfeiture of property derived from crime as part of a convicted
individual’s sentence. In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order the forfeiture of
proceeds, property, and assets derived directly or indirectly from the crime, without prejudice
to the rights of bona fide third parties. Article 77(2) also enables the Court to impose fines as
part of the sentences it levies.184 Part 10 of the Rome Statute addresses the enforcement of the
ICC’s sentences and orders, and specifically imposes a duty on States Parties to enforce fines
and forfeiture measures as penalties.185
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Under the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, States Parties must ensure
that they have laws and procedures in place to perform four primary functions: (1) trace,
freeze, and seize the proceeds of ICC crime;186 (2) effect forfeiture of the proceeds of
crime;187 (3) collect fines;188 and (4) transfer to the Court any property or proceeds they obtain
as a result of their enforcement of a judgment of the Court.189 States have proceeded in
distinct and creative manners in implementing these obligations within their domestic laws.190
The Manual for Ratification and Implementation identifies three general approaches:

(1) providing for a general power to enforce all orders directly or
(2) separate powers for both fines and reparation orders or
(3) general power for enforcement but leaves out procedural details191

Australia and the UK are to be counted in the first approach. They convert the ICC orders into
orders issued by the national courts.192 In addition, these two countries adopt a ‘self-contained
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regime for executing such orders.’193 Canada adopts a largely similar approach to that in
Australia and the UK albeit through the amendment of existing legislation to facilitate the
provision of the specific assistance requested by the ICC. A hybrid approach is seen in
Norwegian legislation which provides for general authority to carry out ICC requests within
the framework of its existing legislation.194

CONCLUSION
The ICC will provide an indispensable backup to national jurisdictions in deterring,
investigating, and prosecuting serious international crimes. The momentum behind the ICC
testifies to the increasing realization by countries that international norms may require
international enforcement mechanisms, especially where individual perpetrators are beyond
the reach of their own domestic courts. Signing, ratifying, and implementing the ICC provides
States with an opportunity to review their existing criminal procedures, and to ensure that
these are consonant with international standards such as those relating to due process, the
protection of victims and witnesses, and jurisdiction over internationally recognised crimes.
The ICC will provide important incentive for States to fine tune their domestic penal
mechanisms and importantly obviate the need to establish reactive ad hoc international
tribunals on a case by case which in practice has proved to be particularly difficult in view of
the political goodwill required.

The ICC in comparison to the ad hoc international criminal tribunals contains elaborate
guidelines in relation to both the nature and manner of fulfilling obligations encapsulated in
the Rome Statute. This paradoxically both weakens and strengthens the Court. As noted by Dr
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Goran Sluiter, ‘[t]he ad hoc tribunals were established with limited mandate. As a result of
their swift creation, the Tribunals, especially the judges themselves, created much of the law.
Therefore it comes as no surprise that the judges have opted for what is, in their eyes, the
most effective cooperation regime. On the other hand, the establishment of the ICC by treaty
triggered protracted rounds of negotiations, which soon revealed that participating states were
not prepared to have the institution shape its own laws in any way. Since the shaping of the
legal assistance regime was left to the participating states, the resulting compromise left the
system significantly weaker on a number of points.’195 Despite this, it is of practical
importance that the court retains discretion to determine the content of the duty to cooperate
and in many instances, its cooperation regime is predominantly hierarchical and vertical in
nature.196

The success of the ICC will ultimately be determined by the level of cooperation it receives
from States. Having no police force, military, or territory of its own, the ICC will rely heavily
on States Parties to, among other things, arrest individuals and surrender them to the Court,
collect evidence, and serve documents in their respective territories. This assistance will be
central to the Court’s ultimate success. Without this assistance, the ICC will find itself
seriously crippled in conducting its proceedings and meeting the lofty aspirations of the
international community. So far the outlook is good, States Parties have overwhelmingly put
in place the necessary legal and administrative mechanisms that will facilitate cooperation
with the ICC. It remains to be seen whether this enthusiasm will be reflected once the ICC’s
operations get underway.
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